

Puntland Post Monthly

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

1. Is the Time Ripe to Review Puntland Public Finances?
2. Consumer Price Index for Puntland State of Somalia
3. Puntland Security Reform is Long Overdue
4. Africom Counterterrorism Strategy in Somalia Mired in Geographic Absurdities
5. Letters to the Editor
6. Lasanod Municipality Arbitrates a Tricky Land Dispute Case
7. Guurti Buys President Bihi a Period of Political Stability
8. Othering Somali Citizens
9. We Are All *Others*

IS THE TIME RIPE TO REVIEW PUNTLAND PUBLIC FINANCES?

By Farah B. Osman

I have watched a session at Puntland Parliament in which MPs asked the Finance Minister, Hassan Shire Abdi, questions about the 2019 budget unveiled in November. The Minister has given an excuse for not being able to answer questions about the new budget. He said that he had no a clue as to how the budget had been prepared.

I have studied the new budget. Since 2020 is just around the corner. Puntland parliament has passed the budget. My discussion will revolve around three aspects of the budget.

For a comparison reason my analysis will partly rest on the temporary budget passed in April 2019. The total of the monthly revenues forecasted was US\$ 14.78 million (US\$ 133.03 million for nine months ending December 2019.).

US\$ 6.06 million of the forecasted revenues were domestically generated. US\$ 8.15 million was external revenues, whereas US\$ 583, 000 is forecasted revenues from generated local governments. There was no a subsidy from the Federal Government of Somalia. Incremental approach has been used to prepare the budget. Hence there is marked overstatement to offset expenditures – a reason the Finance Ministry of Puntland has adopted expenditures approach in the course of preparing the new budget.

1. Budgetary imbalance: Expenditure allocations within budget items

Domestic revenues forecasted for nine months (April – December) amounts to US \$ 54 million. Forecasted expenditure is based on the forecasted revenues. US\$ 48. 9 million had been allocated to cover salaries and fringe benefits, services equipment and sundry expenses.

Continued on page 2, column 1

From page 1

From the above data one can infer that 89.9% of domestic revenues get incurred as expenditure. 11% of the total expenditure will go to public services. Ministries that directly contribute to the economy – Ministry of Livestock, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry Commerce, Ministry of Tourism, and Ministry of Ports – have not been given a share in the public service budget allocation. Youth organisations, women’s organisations, cultural and sports activities have not received budget allocations in the new budget.

Recurrent expenditure estimates of government organisations stands at US\$ 6.05 million per month, 41.3% of which has been allocated to the Presidency and the Finance Ministry. Forty organisations of Puntland State share the remainder.

Allowances outside salaries and non-monetary benefits granted to the Finance Ministry and Presidency amount to US\$ 653, 430 (for nine months). This allocation dwarfs US\$ 575, 000 – the total budget of nine months for the Ministry of Justice, Ministry Livestock, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Office of the Attorney General.

The monthly domestic and foreign travels of the Finance Ministry is US\$ 70,000, that is 50% more than the total domestic and foreign travels of the rest of the government agencies (US\$ 35,700). Forecasted hospitality expenditure at the Presidency stands at US\$ 112,625 per month that is 16% more than the general expenditure for the judiciary of Puntland.

Expenditure for publicity and advertisement for the Finance Ministry amount to US\$ 40,000 per months compared to US\$ 30,200 earmarked as monthly expenses for the Office of the Auditor General. More than forty people are on the payroll of the Auditor General’s office.

2. Lack of clarity in the budget

The budget allocation for Puntland Dervish Forces amounts to US\$ 1.39 million, making the Force second organisation to have received generous appropriations next to the Finance Ministry. However, repeated mutinies of the Dervish forces raise questions about how Puntland government pays salaries of soldiers.

Included in the general government expenditure is US\$ 8.155 million classified as external revenues. This income consists of donations from international organisations and the World Bank. The forecasted

government expenditure noted it as general expenditure, unlike recurrent expenditure. It does not get channeled through the bank of the government. In addition, there is no an official report on donations Puntland receives. It is the remit of the Auditor General to publish a report on donations that Puntland receives.

3. How Puntland Public Finance Authorities Work

The management of Public Finance Agencies consist of agencies independent of each other but that collaborate. Puntland public finance agencies are the Ministry of Finance, the Government Bank, the Accountant General and the Office of the Auditor General.

Puntland Public Finance Authorities are fully formed organisationally but their work is not balanced. This has caused collective poor performance, with the Accountant General and the Office of the Auditor General bearing the brunt of underperformance.

The World Bank funds Capacity Injection Project and Somalia PPF Capacity Building. Those projects help Puntland modernise its public finances processes. The World Bank commits US\$ 11 million per annum. However, public finance system of Puntland

predominantly uses paperwork. Puntland has not fully transitioned its public finances system into an electronic system. With those projects nearing completion, how Puntland has benefited from the timely financial and technical assistance of the World Bank is a question worth asking.

In conclusion, transparency, monitoring and accountability are necessary conditions for good governance. The time is ripe for a conversation about the state of public finances in Puntland.

Farah Bashir Osman is co-founder of Haldoor Forum. His commentaries have appeared in major Somalia news websites.

Advertise with *Puntland Post Monthly* and *Puntlandpost.net*. For rates please email:

ppm@puntlandpost.net


A Closer Look of Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Puntland State of Somalia

By **Abdighani H. Hirad**

Consumer price indices are important to the development of a country. The Puntland State of Somalia (PLS), a regional administration which is a member state of the Somalia Federal Government (FGS) has developed a monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI is published by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), Department of Statistics for Puntland.

As noted in MoPIC’s website, “CPI is obtained by comparing through time, the cost of a fixed basket of commodities purchased by consumers.” The Consumer Price Index (CPI) October 2019 was recently published by the Department and it shows the changes for various components of the CPI, as depicted in the following chart:

Chart 1: Change in the Price Indices for October 2019 for Puntland



As shown in Figure 1, for the month of October 2019, overall, the CPI was up 0.2 percent compared to 0.8 percent for the month of September. The monthly change, which is a measure of inflation, appears to be stable from month to month.

Major contributors of the increase from September to October were:

Recreation and Culture with an increase of 3.8%, followed by Communication (+3.6%), Education (+2.6%), Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco & Narcotics (+1.9%), Health (+0.8%) and Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages (+0.5%).

In addition, major areas of decrease for the same period were:

Transportation and Restaurants and Hotels which had the largest decrease of 1.3%, followed by Housing, Water, Electricity and Gas (-0.6%) and Clothing and Footwear (-0.3%), which as noted by PL MoPIC, led to a muted and flat result at the All Groups CPI level.

Chart 2: All Groups CPI - Combination inflation rate and index graph




Chart 2 illustrates year-over-year the inflation rate (left axis) and all group CPI (right axis). Puntland appears to be experiencing increased inflation rates in 2019 compared with prior years of 2018 and 2017 as shown in the Figure 2. For example, the yearly inflation rate for October 2019 was an increase of 14.1 percent (74.1 in October 2018 and 84.6 in October 2019) compared with a decrease of 15.2 percent in October 2018. This is a great cause for concern and inflation rate at this rate is unsustainable, in the long run. While a regional state such as PL with meager resources and nascent economy might not have inflationary rate policy, a symmetric 2 percent objective is generally a good rate to maintain for a healthy economy.


As noted in MoPIC October Report, major contributors of significant prices increase were:

Clothing and Footwear which experienced a hefty increase of 24.2% followed by Transportation (+20.7%), Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco & Narcotics (+18.6%), Health (+18.0%), Housing, Water, Electricity & Gas (+17.1%) and Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages (+12.8%).

As is done in other CPIs, the Puntland CPI can be measured by excluding often volatile food and energy categories. Nonetheless, Puntland's CPI report showed people in that region paid more for items such as clothing, footwear, transportation and non-discretionary items. The increase in transportation could be

influenced by the importation of fuel and other lubricants.

Chart 3: CPI Index for Somalia



Compared with overall Somalia (as depicted at chart 3), the inflation of Puntland appears to be heightened. For example, the Somali inflation was reported to be (over the twelve months to the month of October 2019) as a decrease of 4.15 percent. Again, this could be due transitional measurement unique to PL and not any structural issues. Similar to the PL CPI, the most significant monthly price increases for the Somali CPI were Transport which had increased 2.11%) from October 2018 to October 2019.

Having government indices such as the CPI is a great step in the development parameters of any state, regional or federal level, and would contribute to

the overall development of Somali in rebuilding its financial institutions.

Abdighani H. Hiram is an economist and statistician, a member of American Statistical Association and Southern Economic Association.



NECSOM is a Somali utility company founded in 2003. It supplies Garowe, the administrative capital of Puntland round-the-clock electricity. NECSOM has partnered with utility companies in Kismayo, Bosaso and other towns in Somalia.

Several years ago, NECSOM began to utilise solar and wind energy to diversify its sources of energy.

NECSOM plays a key role in contributing to economic infrastructures in Puntland. Maintaining security, and gentrifying the capital city of Puntland, Garowe.

NECSOM has cut prices of electricity for its customers

At NESCOM you will meet dedicated management and trained staff.

For more details, please contact us on:

Telephone:

+252907794117/+2529077941959/+252907790495/+2525843333

Email: info@necsom.com

Website:

<http://www.necsom.com/>



GRADE A SOFTWARE & WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT

Tailor-made, all-in-one software, web solution: domain name registration, hosting and application development.

Email: info@ramaas.com

www.ramaas.com

Puntland Security Reform is Long Overdue

Puntland Post, our sister news website, reports that President Said Abdullahi Deni of Puntland State had [managed to persuade UAE authorities to renew funding for Puntland Maritime Police Force](#). An influential politico-business clique has been eying the new contract. The clique's interest sparked deployment of troops in Bosaso, the commercial city of Puntland.

Puntland Government responded to the unauthorised deployment by sending troops to Bosaso. Elders intervened to avoid a clash between the two Puntland forces. As if that was not enough, Puntland Forces in cahoots with clan militias stormed a Galka'yo courthouse to release men who were convicted of contraband alcohol. [Commander of North Mudug Police Division Colonel Jama Mohammed Ahmed told Puntland Post the police arrested one of the attackers but the two convicts](#) "are still at large". Puntland forces are organised along subclan lines. They are territorial — each

sector wields influence in the area it controls. Puntland Development Plan 2017-2019 notes "the security sector [of Puntland State] includes core security actors such as (Puntland Police Force (PPF), Puntland Security Force (PSF), Puntland Security Service/ PSS, Puntland Intelligence Agency (PIA) and Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF)."

Puntland is a Federal Member State but its forces do not come under the command of the Commander of the Somali National Army. Puntland has denied its forces training opportunities from which different sectors of the Somali National Army benefit. Attempts to introduce biometric system to root out corruption in the Puntland security sector has not succeeded. The Development Plan does not lay the emphasis on professionalising Puntland forces. This reticence over pressing institutional failures reflects recurrence of mutinies that may plunge Puntland into widespread lawlessness


© 2019 *Puntland Post Monthly*

One drinks water to her/his satisfaction only with her/his own hands – A Somali proverb

Africom Counterterrorism Strategy Mired in Geographic Absurdities

Africom counter-terrorism operations in Puntland State affects lives of innocent people in parts of Bari region. Drones killed two men collecting frankincense in a remote area known as Ameyra. [Families of victims sent a letter to Puntland Parliament, where an MP had read out the statement.](#) Poor

geographic knowledge causes wrong operational decisions. Clues to this counterterrorism anomaly can be found in a bar chart in paper entitled [Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells across the Continent.](#)



In the chart Somalia appears twice under Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) and Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (ISSKTU). Egypt crops up in the chart twice under Islamic State in Egypt (IS-Misr) and Islamic State in Sinai. Drone attacks against civilian populations put Puntland Government in a bind.

It relies upon Africom operations to deter ISIS attacks by fighters in far-away and less populated parts of Bari region but it finds hard to be viewed as indifferent to the plight of families affected by drone attacks. Africom claims it conducts strikes with the Somali Federal Government forces strikes against parts of southern Somalia under Al-shabaab.

© *Puntland Post Monthly*, 2019

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

An Accounting System for Somalia

The article by Ali H. Warsame on the need for an accounting system for Somalia took me on a trip to the memory lane. During 1980s I was accepted into the MBA program run by the California State University (Fresno) at ex-SIDAM.

Having acquired a science degree only a year ago before starting the course, the intensive nature of the MBA program helped me to pull all-nighters with my friends. With no background in accounting and economics I had to master in one year the material similar to the core undergraduate syllabus for SIDAM students. The civil war has put paid to the progress

made in the training of able managers and accountants. Both Fresno and New York State University at Albany MBA programs in Somalia were laudable and timely.

Ali A. Adan

Worcester, Massachusetts, USA

Beware of Debt trap after Debt Relief

May I congratulate you for interviewing Professor Mohamed Said Samantar of Puntland State University on the prospects for debt relief for Somalia. The debt we owe multilateral organisations is not measly. It may be easier to cancel a debt but it is equally easier to become indebted again to foreign countries or Bretton Woods duo. Somalia lacks effective institutions accountable to citizens. Debt relief will enable the Federal Government of Somalia to commit funds to rebuilding the nation instead of servicing a debt

Sahro H. Mursal

Bosaso, Somalia

Puntland Post Monthly

welcomes readers' comments. Send comments or feedback to to: ppm@puntlandpost.net.


Adeegga Kayd ee shirkadda Golis

Macmiil,

Haddii aad iska diiwaangalisey adeegga Kayd, Numbarradaadii ma kaydsatay?

Fadlan si laguugu kaydiyo nambarradaada aadna hadhow, haddii moobaylku kaa lumo, dib ugu heli kartid nambarradaadii, fadlan marka hore ku wareeji SIM card aad leedah kaaga numberada kuugu jira qolofkaaga(mobaylkaaga) ku wareeji SIM card-ka aad leedahay oo raac tallaabooyinkan:

1. Tag calaamadda contacts ee saaran shaashadda
2. Kaddib soo fur dhibcaha saddexda ah ee is kor saaran kana muuqda dhanka ku beegan midigtaada ama saddexda xariijimmo ee ku beegan bidixdaada, oo dusha sare saaran.
3. Kaddibna dooro **Manage contacts**
4. kaddib dooro **Import/export contacts**
5. kaddib dooro **Export**.
6. Kaddib dooro kaarka **SIM 1** ama **SIM 2**.
7. Kaddib gal **Adeegga Kayd** oo dheh Kaydi kaddibna OK dooro si nambarradu u kaydsamaan.



Lasanod Municipality Arbitrates a Tricky Land Dispute Case

Courts in Somaliland devote more time to land disputes than to other business cases. A tricky land disputes surfaced in Lasanod after the owner of a property found out that a neighbour annexed three metre square of land belonging to the family, who sold a plot of land more than 25 years ago.

The complainant has stumbled on the missing land when he looked at the deeds showing the plan of the house.

After engineers at Lasanod Municipality examined the case, they urged the family that annexed the land to agree to arbitration. The family has agreed to have the three metre plot of land evaluated the basis of the prices of whole plot of land on which the building stands. This case reflects how a rule of law is the key to enforcing property rights

Somaliland Council of Elders Buys Bihi a Period of Political Stability

The extension of the term of office for Somaliland MPs and member of the Elders' Council (*Guurti*) has lifted political pressure off the shoulders of Somaliland President, Muse Bihi Abdi, who celebrated in November the second anniversary of his term in office. The Council of Elders expedited the term of extension for Somaliland's two institutions key to the political processes.

The two opposition parties, Waddani and UCIF, rejected the term extension. A Hargeisa-based consultative forum known as *Madasha* (The Forum) made up of prominent Somalilanders deplored what they view as authoritarian turn in Somaliland leadership. Somaliland political parties have been at loggerheads over the time-frame to hold parliamentary elections in 2020. The UNSOM Chief, James Swan, in his statement to the UN Security Council, urged consensus to hold parliamentary elections – a

milestone in Somaliland political calendar.



Waddani and UCID Leaders

The term extension for the Parliament and the Council of Elders gives President Bihi a breathing-space. The sticking-point in negotiations to hold parliamentary elections was the make-up of the electoral commission. Waddani insisted on the replacement of a member of the commission. Members of the new electoral commission of Somaliland took oath a in November and are likely to oversee parliamentary elections that will take place in 2020, if opposition parties change their mind.

Othering Somali citizens as 'Looma Ooyaan'

By Samiya Lerew

Tribalism is essentially hardwired in the human psyche. We have evolved as humans alongside conflict and warfare; those who hunt together, defend together and attack together will survive in the Serengeti of human evolution. Looked at this way, tribalism itself may not seem so disadvantageous; but when mixed with the politics of polarisation, it can be lethal. US troops withdrew from Somalia in 1995. Their mission—Operation “Restore Hope”—was left unfinished and unaccomplished. The consequence for Somalia was that a Pandora’s Box was opened. Civil strife, famine and warlordism ran rampant before the intervention. An era of social Darwinism has reared its head as a tool that assisted in the *Othering* of the Somali natives.



Amin Amir pokes fun at Othering

This phenomenon is too pressing to be denied a 21st century discourse of its own.

According to Mohammed Eno, Professor of Social Studies Education (St Clements University, Somalia), this is how the Somali political system, “4.5”, can aptly be described:

“The 4.5 formula for political power sharing represents the social fibre that encapsulates and feeds from the Somali founding ancestor narratives. It was incubated in Sodere, Ethiopia, in 1997 and introduced in 2000 during the 13th Somali reconciliation conference in Arta, Djibouti. In other words, Somali political and cultural elites incorporated the social distinctions created by the formula narratives into the political and nation-making processes in a way that is accessible to organizations and both victim and victimizer. The participants divided the Somali society into superior and inferior groups: descendants of the so-called Somali original ancestor (Darood, Digil-Mirifle, Dir, and Hawiye) as superiors and none descendants (Bantu Jareerwayne and occupational caste groups) as inferiors.”

As succinct as Professor Eno’s description is, the chaotic polarisation did not end there. It bled into the attitudes of the [politically and economically] dominant clans whose relationship with each other is defined by constant antagonism. “Anything you can do, I can do better” became the sordid mantra of the four clans. What one has, the other desires to acquire by any means. This rivalry had boiled to the point where two brothers in their own homeland

would sever their bonds, form their own states, and compete with each other on one hand and with the central government on the other. This is precisely the relationship between the provinces of Galmudug and Puntland today. Puntland is run by a sub-clan: 'Majeerten'. This group shares kinship with those in charge of Galmudug 'Habargedir'; sometimes these members even share a mother or grandmother. Through the eyes of non-Somalis, Puntland and Galmudug appear to be at odds with each other—they appear as the picture of Cain and Abel. Like the two biblical brothers, they share blood: but the comparison stops there. In reality, they are not so dissimilar in behaviour or philosophy. They are close relatives who share information, resources and grant political power to each other. Alex de Waal described in detail [The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa] how two Somali clans appear to be at odds with each other, but behind all veils, their top leaders remain thick as thieves. Marginalisation has allowed the unarmed groups to be *othered* under the 'Arta 4.5' power share. If one clan excludes another, it guarantees higher status for the higher-ups in the exclusive group. Like a vengeful deity, they are liable to expel misbehaving members, therefore commanding more respect—or fear. The economies of these regions are fuelled firstly by handouts from international aid. State-building efforts and remittances answer for the rest of the regions' resources. Regional authorities are run by and for dominant clan members who

collect salaries as members of regional parliaments. Their salaries are sanctioned by the UN under 'state-building efforts'. Aid has a Janus face in Somalia. On one hand, aid is supposed to provide much-needed help to the marginalised peoples of the land. On the other hand, it funds and perpetuates the *Othering* of the very people it tries to help. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and a number of UN humanitarian agencies do try hard in providing needed support of minorities in Somalia. However, aid to the country is distributed to consortiums who are ill-suited for the job and local sub-distributors who then use it as a means to further discrimination. Because these distributors and conglomerates misappropriate the aid, the necessity for international aid gets perpetuated. In the absence of a viable economy, the powerful actors view aid as a lucrative franchise. Remittances are also a double-edged sword; on one hand, it provides a means of allowing diaspora to send money to their loved ones, especially in the thick of civil war. On the other hand, it becomes an albatross to the efforts of state-building. Remittances companies developed outlets which house and distribute these funds as business ventures. These businesses control every micro- and macroeconomic affair in the nation and have a vested interest in perpetuating the chaos of the country.

According to Sultan Ibrahim Abdullahi Addo, in his article *Bad Policies of Marginalising Organic natives in their own region:*

"If one fully understands the root cause of the cycles of any conflict, one should be able to express it in a single statement. The root cause of the cycles of the Somali conflicts ... [results from] a group of ambitious and determined Somali criminals ... [with the goal] targets to marginalize certain Somali communities (agrarian) economically within that communities' region. In the process they use primarily clan [power based in] along with intimidat[ion]... religion, politics and propaganda through the media to ...attain their ... [goals]. Though this may be the root cause, many missed that it remained as the same factor that perpetuates the cycles of the Somali conflicts to this day." [Published on beizani.com]

Sultan Ibrahim only scratches the surface of *Othering* people on the basis of perceived supremacy. Dr M. Eno, however, goes much deeper in his analysis of discrimination. Eno eloquently explains the causes of this behaviour as he follows the journey from forms of oppression to more lucrative wealth-making for local NGOs. Eno writes:

"It is based on the conscious or unconscious assumption that a certain identified group poses a threat to the favoured group. It is not these attributes themselves that are the problem, of course, but how they are made salient and how they are manipulated.

I am therefore particularly concerned with how *Othering* shows up in today's power structures: how it is used to divide and dehumanise groups, and capture and reshape government and institutions. For society's

leaders and culture play an oversized role in helping us make sense of change – and so greatly affect our responses to anxiety”.

What Eno describes is a classic evidence of how people who might have everything in common (culturally, linguistically, religion, kinship etc.) are made to believe that they are somehow different from each other. In central, north and northwest of Somalia, superior ancestry based on a camel-herding pastoralist mythology has been used to justify segregation, marginalisation and suppression. In most cases, villages are raided. Houses, farms, and personal possessions are torched, and village people are sent to IDP camps or refugee camps in the neighbouring countries. Eno pinpoints and elucidates where marginalisation becomes part of the international narrative of Othering:

“All international organizations, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Care International, and other service providers followed this division in terms of all their provision of assistance to Somalis in the refugee camps, categorizing the groups as Somalis, Somali outcasts, and Somali Bantu.

In time, the separation of all Somalis in the refugee camps into oppressor and oppressed and the kind of victim narratives provided by Bantu and outcast individuals seeking resettlement to the United States and other parts of the West became standardized case reports as filed in the organizational immigration records. The policy of separation was used to protect the marginalised groups from the imminent domination of their

oppressors who had immediately upon arrival in the refugee camps created leadership structures that obscured the equal rights of the minorities. More significantly, the policy empowered the minorities to establish their own independent leadership structures to liaise directly with the international organizations providing service to the refugees. It also resulted not only in the allocation of separate settlements but also provision of separate schools for the minority children who were facing extreme forms of marginalization when sharing classrooms with their noble-claiming peers in the refugee camps.

Moreover, even in the regional offices and sub-offices of these service-providing organizations, identities such as “Somali Bantu,” or “Somali outcast” have become very effectively constructed to the point where they became synonymous with “oppression,” marginalization,” and “vulnerability.” In the course of time, the organizational symbols or narratives of identity paved the way for individual and community-wide consideration for resettlement in many countries in the West, mainly in the United States, as a durable solution to the persecution they had been facing over the years and the possibility of suffering further persecution upon returning home. Understanding the interaction between client and advocacy organizations is extremely important in that the construction of group identity based on victim narratives alone could not create normatively audible stories without the active participation of the listeners, the organizations that had the access to influence. As a former

refugee from one of the camps in Kenya admitted in a discussion with one of the authors (Mohamed) in Louisville, Kentucky, in 2008, “Without high level advocacy campaign by the UNHCR and other service providers, we would *still be rotting in the refugee camps in Kenya.*”

Minorities and marginalised groups have had all the chips stacked up against them. The only way forward is through free and fair elections, where all citizens are offered a one-man-one-vote system. Real democracy scares the dominant clans, because in reality, the real minority is them.

Bibliography

Alex de Waal, 05/10/2015. The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa. Money, War and the Business of Power. Published by Polity Press, Cambridge.

M. Eno ed al Abdi M. Kusow, Formula Narratives and the Making of Social Stratification and Inequality. Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 1-15 American Sociological Association 2015, DOI:

10.1177/2332649215574362, sre.sagepub.com

Sultan Ibrahim Addo, 2019, Bad Policies of Marginalising Organic natives in their own region. Published on beizani.com

Top illustration: Amin Amir, 20 April 2015, published on aminarts.com

Editor's note: looma-ooyan means someone whose death or suffering does not elicit sympathy.

WE ARE OTHERS

By Liban Ahmad

The least-discussed aspect of Somali politics is the alliance of Somali clans known as *Others*. In 2000 when the Djibouti-sponsored reconciliation conference was going on in Arta City, participants agreed the infamous 4.5 power-sharing mechanism.

The digit 4 refers to self-styled four powerful clans. This division of political power neither took into account political realities prevailing in Somalia nor the impact arbitrary allocation of parliamentary seats has on the executive and legislative branches.

In 2000 Somalia was divided into three parts. In the ex-British Somaliland, an administration that unilaterally seceded from Somalia was about to celebrate its ninth anniversary. In Bari, Nugaal and parts of Mudug an autonomous administration founded in 1998 was beginning to make its presence felt in the Somali political landscape. In South-central and Southern parts, warlords ruled with the exception of Bay and Bakool then under Rahanweyn Resistance Army.

The sponsors of the Arta conference promoted the

reconciliation strategy as a sharp break with the past in the sense that they described participants as the civil society. The exclusion of warlords and leaders of existing administrations necessitated the use of the phrase *civil society*. Influential participants at Arta shared an outlook with participants of earlier reconciliation conferences, who looked upon commanding clan militias as a basis for substantive political power.

At the reconciliation conference elites from the four clans resolved to institutionalise and defend what participants of earlier conferences were not able to agree and cement. Somali clans whom the four clans relegated to a minority status had not accepted the lowly citizenship status imposed upon them. Members of each of the four major clans do not outnumber the clans under lumped into *Others* category.

The phrase *xaq maannu raadinayno, xal baannu raadinaynaa* (we are not looking for restitution, we are looking for solution) was the new aphorism on which the reconciliation conference was rested. There was no a logic to relegating Somali social groups in inter-riverine areas and major

urban centres of Mogadishu, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle and Hiiraan to a minority status. They have suffered disproportionately when clans with armed militias carved out Somalia into clan fiefdoms. What remains puzzling is the consensus forged by self-appointed representatives of Somali clans to put themselves on pedestal to be able to deny their compatriots political rights and associated privileges.

In a stroke of pen they have institutionalized unfounded minority status for Somalis whose work ethic and commitment to equality are what Somalia has been striving to regain. With Somalia preparing for one person, one vote poll in 2021, the plight of Somalia's political disenfranchised is likely to deepen the fifth time. The federal system Somali participants of Kenya-sponsored reconciliation conference adopted in 2004 is premised on the 4.5. The enlarged, transitional parliament of 2009, and post-transition parliament of 2012 were based on 4.5, so are the current federal parliament and the upper house.

Although the International Community has hailed the progress made in institution-building, the dominant Somali political class has been, through indifference, disempowering non-4.5 constituencies to the political inequality that affect lives of roughly 50% of the Somalis. The estimated percentage might lead someone to conclude that 50% of Somalis enjoy political rights denied to a half of the population. The establishment of Federal Member States made the discriminatorily subordinate status of the Somali citizen starker. The pre-federal dispensation institutionalised 4.5 whereas federalism deepened it. Federal Member States reflect political power of the four clans on the one hand and the marginalisation of *Others* (0.50) on the other

The perpetuation of minority status seems to be confined to some Somali social groups. Their lack of political rights codified in the 4.5 system translates into lesser life opportunities in fiefdoms carved out by self-appointed, politically powerful clans.

Minority status in Somalia cancels out equality of opportunity. Somali social

groups known for creating value by using their skills and business acumen now lack a level playing-field in their homeland.

Belonging to a clan with political privileges means having an unfettered access to public resources and an unfair business advantages over minority clans.

There is a consensus among political classes of the four politically powerful clans to avoid discussing the plight of their compatriots as a result of the 4.5 system.



Tweet posted by the Somali Investment Office woos potential investors who could benefit from the “high rate of return in the farming sector.” Arable lands in southern parts

of Somalia particularly Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle and Bay region have seen heaviest battles during 1990s, when clan militias were vying for the control of districts near Shabelle river. The 1992 man-made famine hit those areas hard.

Agricultural productivity in inter-riverine areas has dwindled after the bulk of the traditionally agricultural communities were forced to flee marauding militias and became Internally Displaced Peoples in other parts of Somalia. Skills of one-time small-holder agricultural communities remain untapped due to security constraints facing them.

On a closer look, the policy to marginalise “*Others*” does not spare members of politically powerful clans either. Identification of Federal Member States assigns some clans privileges to enjoy concrete political representation and nepotistic economic advantages over the politically and residentially excluded.

If Person X belongs to Federal Member State Y, he/she cannot exercise citizenship rights to compete for jobs in another Federal Member State. In a regions where an

administration adopts a pro-citizenship policies the fear of being evicted hangs over the heads of citizens, who are presumed not to belong to the Federal Member State.

Acknowledging that the political dispensation based on 4.5 values political might over citizenship rights could contribute to undoing the political marginalisation affecting Somalis in one way or another. What was intended to violate citizenship rights of a select Somali clans has now become a collective imposition on all Somali clans, proving the validity of Martin Luther King's dictum: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."

Somalis we call *Others* are not poor or minorities. Our social contract aims to make them poor and politically powerless. How can we remedy injustices meted out to them? How does the plight of politically and economically marginalised Somalis square with the following sub articles of Article 2 in the Draft Constitution: "1) All citizens, regardless of sex, religion, social or economic status, political opinion, clan, disability, occupation, birth or

dialect shall have equal rights and duties before the law.

(2) Discrimination is deemed to occur if the effect of an action impairs or restricts a person's rights, even if the actor did not intend this effect."

The Draft Constitution guarantees rights of the Somali citizen. In this context the 4.5 mechanism violates the letter and spirit of the Draft Constitution. Without speaking out against the discriminatory and marginalising powers built into the 4.5 system, the judiciary of a country whose political system disenfranchises citizens cannot become one of the foundations for reconciliation and nation-building after catastrophic state failure.

Shirkadda Korontada NECSOM ee Garoowe

A Garowe-based Electricity Company

Shirkadda tamarta Soomaaliyeed ee NECSOM waxaa la asaasay 2003dii, waxayna koronto 24-ka saac ah siisaa magaalada Garoowe, caasimadda Puntland. Waa shirkadda kaliya ee Soomaaliya

oo bixisa adeeg koronto isku si u shaqaysa habeen iyo maalin.

NECSOM oo bahwadaag la ah shirkadaha korontada Kismaayo, Boosaaso iyo magaalooyin kale, waxay sanadihii u dambeeyay billowday isticmaalka cadceedda iyo dabaysha.

Shirkadda NECSOM waxay kaalin mug leh ka qaadataa kaabayaasha dhaqaalaha dalka, sugidda amniga iyo kor u qaadista bilicda magaalada caasimada u ah Puntland, Garowe.

NECSOM waxay macaamiisheeda u sameysay qiime-dhimis si bulshadu uga faa'iideysto.

NECSOM waxaa kuugu diyaar ah maamul iyo shaqaale loo carbiyay shaqadooda.

Wixii macluumaad ah oo intaas dheer kala xiriir .

Tell:

+252907794117/+2529077941959/
+252907790495/+2525843333

Email: info@necsom.com

Website:

<http://www.necsom.com/>

Saynab Moallim Foundation

Saynab Moallim Foundation is a charitable organization established on January 2018 in Mogadishu, Somalia to promote health and education for the mother and children. The foundation is non-profit making, non-government, non-political organization which will serve the public regardless of religion, gender, class or creed or political affiliation. The foundation is planned to operate in all the states of Somalia and has branded itself after a comprehensive strategic plan workshop designed for the years 2018-2023.



Vision **A community** in which every woman and child realizes their rights for both physical and mental health and has the opportunity for the best healthcare in order to shape a prosperous and healthy society.
Mission **To increase the**

awareness of the society in the mother and child care, and to help reduce the number of maternal mortality and child mortality in Somalia. Objectives and goals The underpinning values which guide us are that at all times we will work in ways which are:

- Reduce child mortality and improve maternal health of the mothers through the support to developing sustainable health services, health infrastructure and capacity development.
- To reduce violence against women and improve gender equality both equality of treatment under the law and equality of opportunity and enhance women's empowerment socially, economically and through organizing women's efforts and unifying their voices.
- Addressing HIV and AIDS in Somalia through capacity building with governmental and non-governmental partners/support to

the local community/CBOs to develop the skills and knowledge. Get Involved Kindness has the power to change the world!

- If you like to contribute, Please Contact Us
-
- Email: info@saynabmoallim.org
-
- Mob:+20 4545 5655
-
- Mob:+20 4545 5655
-
- Health Programmes
- Educational Programmes
- Livelihood, Water and Sanitation support
- Lobbying and advocacy
- Human rights
- Capacity building
- One Personal Trainer
- Big gym space for training
- Free tools & props
- Free locker
- Free before / after shower