Mogadishu (PP Editorial) — Today is the last day of 2024, a year marked by inter-clan and intra-clan conflicts in Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia has faced a significant loss of confidence due to several contentious policies: attempts to amend the draft constitution without achieving consensus; efforts to overthrow a Federal Member State, and: alleged support for clan militias attacking Ceelbaraf with government-supplied weapons. These actions highlight the shortcomings of the federal system, two decades after its adoption in Kenya.
The Federal Government has also been criticised for misusing Somalia’s sovereignty by signing multiple defence pacts with various countries. This was ostensibly to counter Ethiopia’s illegal maritime Memorandum of Understanding with the Somaliland Administration, a secessionist entity in northern Somalia.
In foreign policy, the Federal Government of Somalia lacks a coherent approach. According to Ibrahim Farah, the author of Somali Foreign Policy 1960-1990: An Analysis of Thirty Years of Diplomatic History, “Somalia does not have a foreign policy. Only the group occupying Villa Somalia formulates foreign [policy] without consultations.” Divergent views on key articles of the Ankara Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia further corroborate this assessment. For instance, National Security Adviser Hussein Mo’allim tweeted that no decision has been made regarding Ethiopian troops in the 2025 AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia, while Somalia’s UN Mission last week stated that Ethiopian troops “will not be participating in the AU peacekeeping missions.”
As a country dependent on peacekeeping forces due to institutional inability to tackle transnational terrorism, Somalia should not have been permitted to sign oil agreements withTürkiye . Türkiye is exploiting Somalia’s weak institutional capacities. The benefits Somalia might reap from debt relief are negated by the risks of incurring new loans or entering into resource agreements with foreign countries and companies.
These policies represent a repudiation of the state-building initiatives spearheaded by Britain in Somalia since 2012, when the transitional period ended after agreements by Somali stakeholders. Britain, as the penholder for Somalia at the United Nations, has neglected Somalia’s interests. As the drafter of resolutions on Somalia, Britain should have avoided creating the impression among Somalis and academics that its emphasis is on saddling Somalia with feeble federal institutions that Somalis cannot hold accountable.
It can be argued that Somalis’ interests were more safely protected during the trusteeship years (1950-1960) than in 2024, when Somalia claims to be a sovereign country. Like the flawed 4.5 power-sharing system, the federal system has enhanced the political privileges of powerful clans at the expense of those unfairly labelled as minorities, who are not numerically minorities.
© Puntland Post, 2024
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