Laascaanood (PP Report) — The Somaliland administration used securitization (treating political problems as security issues) combined with political marketplace to control Laascaanood for fifteen years. The securitization budget was earmarked for buying temporary loyalty of local militias. Somaliland administration found hard to diversify its core militias — more than 85% of the securitization budget went to ragtag militias once led by Mahad Ambashe, a former shepherd. He resisted efforts by Hargeisa to employ militias from other neighborhoods in Laascaanood. Defying his wish meant a revolt similar to the one that forced Somaliland forces to flee Laascaanood in January 2023.
The securitization dynamic vested in Ambashe powers to employ militias on a quota-basis. The rule of thumb Ambashe upheld was meant to prevent Somaliland from making a pact with other Laascaanood neighborhoods to reduce its total reliance on his militias then based in West Laascaanood.
Financially, this strategy made sense for Ambashe whose loyalty to Somaliland was not matched by any other local militias. Ambashe’s militias known as Caaglayaal (plastic water carriers) were embedded with Somaliland forces before the secessionist administration captured Laascaanood in October 2007. Somaliland administration did not manage to replicate this symbiotic relationship in other Laascaanood neighborhoods: securitization empowers one group at the expense of other groups. The only path open to rival militias or politicians was to lobby Hargeisa to employ militias, a proposal whose success was drastically limited by the quota Ambashe introduced to retain his influence and prevent the emergence of rival caaglayaal.
Ambashe annuled the 2017 the Khaatumo leader’s agreement with Somaliland administration and forced Saleebaan Haglatoosiye iyo Abdirizak Atash to form political associations in an attempt to contest for a political party status in Hargeysa. The two political aspirants resigned a few weeks ago. They called on Somaliland administration to withdraw its troops in Sool.
Securitization was a prize for which all wannabe politicians and militia organizers were vying for, oblivious to the inability of Somaliland administration to dilute its reliance on a group of militias that hosted Hargeisa forces in Laascaanood and nearby villages.
The International Community footed the securitization bill on the understanding that Somaliland controlled Laascaanood through local militias. None of 4000 local militias once in the Somaliland payroll had been able to follow the instructions from Hargeisa to patrol Laascaanood streets to reassert their loyalty to Somaliland administration forces who feared house-to-house combat if they attempted to return to Laascaanood two weeks after locals kicked them out.
Reconfiguration of local militias undercut the influence of Ambashe, who told Somaliland administration Interior Minister that “local militias armed to teeth are controlling Laascaanood neighborhoods”. Ambashe was not ready to engage local rival militias in street fighting. Somaliland administration did not promise him medical attention for any of his militia members. Subsequently, his militias agreed to be disarmed and then reorganized into a resistance force against his secessionist allies.
The Laascaanood conflict demonstrates the limits and futility of securitization policy modelled on the “war on terror”. Somaliland administration failed to sell the International Community the securitization narrative to label Laascaanood residents terrorists and to justify its secession war under the pretext that Al-shabaab “is in Laascaanood”. The terrorism labelling card, the bread and butter of the securitization policy, backfired on the secessionist administration of Somaliland.
© Puntland Post, 2023
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